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NOTE 
Eighth Circuit Bungles Bundled Discounts: 
The Court Avoids Resolving Bundled 
Discounts 
Southeast Missouri Hospital v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 
2011) 
MELISSA A. CULLMANN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
From fast-food value meals to buy one get one free deals at the grocery 
store, bundled discounts are in virtually every market.1  Bundled discounts 
encompass several different discounts,2 but the most common understanding 
of bundled discounts occurs when multiple products are sold together for less 
than the total price of the products sold individually.3  Bundled discounts can 
provide a variety of efficiencies for sellers and can broaden the relationship 
between the buyer and seller.4  Buyers also receive benefits by reducing 
transaction costs and increasing their purchasing power.5   For example, if a 
retail store offers shampoo and conditioner for a discount, it induces the 
buyer to purchase both products and take advantage of the discount.  The 
buyer gets the benefit of the discount and the seller sells two products rather 
than just one. 
  
 * Truman State University Bachelor of Science in Business Administration; 
J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2013; Associate Editor, Mis-
souri Law Review, 2012-13.  I would like to thank Professor Thom Lambert for his 
help throughout my drafting and editing process.  
 1. Blake I. Markus, Note, Bundled Discounts: The Ninth Circuit and the Third 
Circuit Are on Separate LePage’s, 73 MO. L. REV. 907, 907 (2008). 
 2. Mark S. Popofsky, Section 2, Safe Harbors, and the Rule of Reason, 15 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1265, 1287 (2008). 
 3. Thomas A. Lambert, Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying and Bundled 
Discounting, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 909, 911 (2011); Richard M. Steuer, Bundles of Joy, 
ANTITRUST, Spring 2008, at 25; John H. Kilper, Note, A Bundle of Trouble:  An 
Analysis of How the Lower Courts Have Handled Bundled Discounts Since LePage’s 
Inc. v. 3M, 72 MO. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2007). 
 4. Bruce H. Kobayashi, Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to Regulat-
ing Commodity Bundling by Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature, 1 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 707, 708 (2005). 
 5. Steuer, supra note 3, at 26. 
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The question pending before many courts is the legality of these dis-
counts.  Most scholars agree that many bundled discounts are beneficial and 
procompetitive, but some are not.6  The issue before many courts and hotly 
debated among antitrust scholars is choosing the proper test to separate the 
good bundled discounts from the bad.  
In Southeast Missouri Hospital v. C.R. Bard, Inc., the Eighth Circuit 
passed on an opportunity to choose a bundled discount test and instead fo-
cused on the proper market for the products at issue.7  This Note first explores 
the bundled discounts and contracts at issue in the instant decision.  It then 
provides a detailed explanation of bundled discounts and the various tests 
proposed for them, as well as an explanation of the Eighth Circuit’s precedent 
concerning bundled discounts.  The Note concludes by analyzing the instant 
decision and discussing why the court should have addressed bundled dis-
counts in its opinion and the consequences of its failure to do so. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Saint Francis Medical Center (St. Francis) brought a class action suit 
against C.R. Bard (Bard) and other defendants for violating “sections 1 and 2 
of the Sherman Act, section 3 of the Clayton Act, and Missouri antitrust 
laws.”8  Saint Francis claimed that certain conduct by Bard constituted an 
unreasonable restraint of trade, an unlawful monopoly, and illegal exclusive 
dealing.9  St. Francis sought relief under sections four and sixteen of the 
Clayton Act and under Missouri law.10  
St. Francis is a hospital in Cape Girardeau, Missouri.11  The hospital is a 
member of two Group Purchasing Organizations.12  A Group Purchasing Or-
  
 6. See Lambert, supra note 3, at 973.  
 7. 642 F.3d 608, 613 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 8. Id. at 610.  The other defendants in the case were Tyco International, US, 
Inc., Tyco Health Care Group, and John Does 1-10.  Id. at 608.  Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act prohibits agreements between competitors that unreasonably restrain 
trade.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  Under section 2 of the Sherman Act, monopolizing or 
attempting to monopolize is illegal.  Id. § 2.  Section 3 of the Clayton Act addresses 
exclusive dealing and tying. Id. § 14. 
 9. St. Francis Med. Ctr. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1078 (E.D. 
Mo. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 616 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 
2010), aff’d sub nom. Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 10. Se. Mo. Hosp., 642 F.3d at 610.  Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides dam-
ages for violations of previous sections of the act. 15 U.S.C. § 15.  A party seeks 
relief for violations of the Sherman Act under section 4 of the Clayton Act.  Id. 
 11. Se. Mo. Hosp., 642 F.3d at 610.  St. Francis is a medium-sized hospital with 
258 beds.  St. Francis Med. Ctr., 657 F. Supp. 2d at 1077. 
 12. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 657 F. Supp. 2d at 1077.  The two GPOs that Saint 
Francis joined were MedAssets for its pharmaceuticals and Novation for its medical 
supplies.  Id.  It is estimated that ninety-six to ninety-eight percent of hospitals belong 
to GPOs. Id. at 1079.  
2
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ganization (GPO) negotiates contracts with suppliers for hospitals.13  Mem-
bership in the GPO is voluntary and members may belong to more than one 
GPO or switch among various GPOs.14  A GPO negotiates contracts with 
suppliers, but does not actually buy the supplies – the hospital buys directly 
from the supplier.15  Hospitals that are members of GPOs are not mandated to 
purchase supplies through GPO contracts; they may purchase “off-
contract.”16 
Bard sells catheters and other medical supplies.17  It is the leading 
United States manufacturer of Foley catheters and has a large share of the 
market for intermittent catheters.18  “Saint Francis purchase[d] Bard catheters 
through a GPO.”19  Bard’s contract through St. Francis’ GPO was a sole-
source contract; Bard was the only supplier on the GPO’s price list and the 
only seller that was negotiated by the GPO.20  Bard’s contracts with the GPOs 
usually involved tiered pricing, where a hospital gets a share-based discount 
when it purchases “higher percentages of supplies from Bard.”21  Hospitals 
can also get a bundled discount when it buys other Bard supplies along with 
catheters.22  St. Francis alleged that Bard used its considerable market power 
to inflate prices and restrained competition through “sole-source [contracts], 
share-based discounts, and bundled discounts.”23  
  
 13. Se. Mo. Hosp., 642 F.3d at 610.  Hospitals belong to GPOs to obtain better 
prices and services, lower transaction costs, obtain assistance with product failures 
and learn knowledge and assessments of products.  St. Francis Med. Ctr., 657 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1078.  GPOs also offer training programs on new products.  Id. 
 14. Se. Mo. Hosp., 642 F.3d at 610. 
 15. Id.  Contracts through GPOs usually last three to eight years and can be 
ended by either side with notice.  Id. 
 16. Id.  Hospitals that use GPOs usually save between ten and fifteen percent on 
their medical supplies.  Id. at 610-11.  GPOs are particularly helpful for smaller hospi-
tals in getting lower prices.  St. Francis Med. Ctr., 657 F. Supp. 2d at 1079. 
 17. Se. Mo. Hosp., 642 F.3d at 611. 
 18. Id.  Foley catheters are tubes attached to a balloon that drain a bladder over 
extended periods of time whereas intermittent catheters are used to drain a bladder 
once and then are discarded.  Id.  Bard’s market share for intermittent catheters is 
disputed with Bard claiming it has thirty-four percent while St. Francis claims it is 
sixty percent under GPO contracts. Id. at 611 n.2. 
 19. Id. at 611. 
 20. Id.  “Bard prefers sole-source contracts with GPOs.”  Id.  According to the 
district court, “there is ‘fierce competition’ for sole-source contracts.”  Id. (quoting St. 
Francis Med. Ctr., 657 F. Supp. 2d at 1084).  Suppliers do not decide if there will be 
a sole-source contract, GPOs make that decision.  St. Francis Med. Ctr., 657 F. Supp. 
2d at 1079. 
 21. Se. Mo. Hosp., 642 F.3d at 611.  The highest discount a hospital can get is 
when it buys at least eighty-five percent of its supplies from Bard.  Id.  There is no 
larger discount for buying Bard catheters exclusively.  Id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Id.  
3
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St. Francis claimed that Bard’s contracts with GPOs were unreasonable 
restraints of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act.24  St. Francis argued 
the contracts were unreasonable restraints of trade because they required hos-
pitals to purchase a specified percentage of supplies from Bard to receive 
discounts.25  St. Francis also claimed the contracts were unreasonable re-
straints of trade because they included loyalty discounts and rebates for pur-
chasing Bard products or penalties for purchasing products from other ven-
dors.26  The complaint alleged that Bard had and maintained monopoly power 
because of this conduct.27  St. Francis asserted that Bard raised barriers to 
entry and proposed pricing structures that excluded competition, including 
technologically superior products made by competitors.28  St. Francis also 
alleged that Bard, to maintain its monopoly, violated section 3 of the Clayton 
Act by making exclusive agreements with hospitals prohibiting them from 
purchasing supplies from Bard’s competitors.29  St. Francis believed that al-
though Bard’s contracts were not technically exclusionary, the effect of the 
terms of the contract made them exclusionary.30  St. Francis argued that the 
discounted prices were too attractive; a hospital could not afford to go to a 
competitor with a smaller discount.31 
In response, Bard first argued that it did not possess the required mo-
nopoly power, a prerequisite to liability.32  In addition, it claimed that St. 
Francis did not define the proper antitrust market.33  Bard further contended 
that St. Francis failed to establish market foreclosure and an antitrust injury, 
and insisted that its contracts and discount programs were not anticompeti-
tive.34 
The Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to Bard.35  
For St. Francis’ claim that Bard violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, the 
hospital needed to satisfy the rule of reason standard that asks “‘whether the 
contract unreasonably restrains trade in a relevant product or geographic mar-
  
 24. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 657 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1099. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. at 1104. 
 30. Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Brief of Defendant-Appellee C. R. Bard Inc. at 40, Se. Mo. Hosp., 642 F.3d 
608 (No. 09-3325), 2010 WL 685836, at *39-40. 
 33. Id. at *29-30. 
 34. Id. at *42, 50, 55. 
 35. St. Francis Med. Ctr. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1107 (E.D. 
Mo. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 616 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 
2010), aff’d sub nom. Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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ket’” and also establish anticompetitive effects from the restraint.36  The court 
found that St. Francis failed to define the relevant product market because it 
wrongly tried to include in the definitions of the product markets GPOs, 
which were the devices by which Bard allegedly used to restrain trade.37  The 
market definitions also incorrectly differentiated between Foley and intermit-
tent catheters when evidence showed that the products were reasonably inter-
changeable and the market depended more on whether the catheter is latex or 
silicone.38  According to the court, St. Francis also failed to prove the restraint 
was anticompetitive.39  St. Francis did not present evidence of actual adverse 
effects on the competition, nor did it prove that Bard had market power.40  
Bard’s actions all had a “legitimate business purpose.”41  The court concluded 
that St. Francis failed to establish an antitrust injury from Bard’s discounts or 
tiered-pricing programs.42 
St. Francis’ second claim, arising under section 2 of the Sherman Act for 
attempted monopoly, was also rejected by the district court.43  St. Francis did 
not establish that Bard had specific intent to destroy competition or that 
Bard’s practices were anticompetitive.44  St. Francis cited various barriers to 
entry imposed by Bard, but the district court determined that it was the GPOs, 
not Bard, that were creating barriers to entry.45  As for St. Francis’ claims that 
Bard engaged in predatory pricing, the district judge determined that Bard’s 
prices were not below average variable cost; thus, they could not be preda-
tory.46  In addition, the court found that St. Francis failed to present evidence 
  
 36. Id. at 1094 (quoting Minn. Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Unity Hosp., 208 
F.3d 655, 659 (8th Cir. 2000)). 
 37. Id. at 1095. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1096, 1098. 
 40. Id. at 1097.  Market power is when the defendant has the ability to raise 
prices without losing sales so as to be unprofitable.  Id. 
 41. Id. at 1098. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. at 1103-04. 
 44. Id. at 1100-03. 
 45. Id. at 1101. 
 46. Id. at 1101-02.  Predatory pricing is when a firm reduces the price of its 
product to below the cost of the product to gain market share.  Id. at 1011.  Other 
competitors will be forced to leave the market because they cannot afford to offer the 
product at the same price.  Id.  Once other competitors have left the market, the firm 
will be able to set prices well above market value and make higher profits.  Id.  To 
determine if a firm is engaging in predatory pricing, the Eighth Circuit looks to aver-
age variable cost.  Id. at 1102.  Average variable cost is “‘the sum of all variable costs 
. . . divided by [the] output.’”  Id. (quoting Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1360 
n.11 (8th Cir. 1989)).  If the price is above the average variable cost, there is a 
“‘strong presumption of legality.’”  Id. (quoting Morgan, 892 F.2d at 1360).  If the 
price is below the average variable cost, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove 
that it is not predatory.  Id. 
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that customers were unwilling to purchase products from various categories 
to receive the discounts.47  Further, there was evidence that customers could 
purchase catheters without having to purchase other products.48  Because of 
these two factors, the court concluded that customers were not injured by 
Bard’s discounts.49  St. Francis’ third claim under section 3 of the Clayton 
Act was denied for the same reasons.50  Because of St. Francis’ failure to 
establish a relevant product market or anticompetitive practices by Bard, the 
district court granted Bard summary judgment.51 
 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals initially issued an opinion in August 
2010, but in October 2010, it was vacated.52  In the first opinion, the court 
affirmed the district court’s granting of summary judgment to Bard.53  The 
opinion focused on unfair pricing claims, including predatory pricing and 
bundled discounts.54  The court did not explicitly adopt the discount attribu-
tion test for bundled discounts, but it analyzed and rejected St. Francis’ claim 
that Bard’s discounts were predatory using the test.55  Other factors were also 
considered in determining that Bard’s actions were legal including that hospi-
tals were not required to purchase 100 percent of their supplies from Bard, 
that participation in the GPO programs was voluntary, and that the primary 
reason hospitals purchased from Bard was because the physicians preferred 
Bard products.56  The court concluded that St. Francis did not suffer any in-
jury because of the contracts.57  In the instant decision, the Eighth Circuit 
again affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Bard but for a 
different reasoning.58  The court applied the Concord Boat Corporation v. 
Brunswick decision and found that St. Francis failed to define a relevant mar-
ket and submarket and therefore failed to establish an antitrust claim.59    
  
 47. Id. at 1102-03. 
 48. Id. at 1103. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1104. 
 51. Id. at 1107. 
 52. Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, 616 F.3d 888, 895 (8th Cir. 2010), vacated, 642 
F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 53. Id. at 895. 
 54. See generally id. 
 55. Id. at 893. The discount attribution test applies the full discount to the com-
petitive product in the bundle.  If after the discount is applied, the price of the com-
petitive product is below the seller’s costs, then the bundled discount may be exclu-
sionary – it may be anticompetitive and illegal. Lambert, supra 3, at 912, 962; Popof-
sky, supra note 2, at 1289. 
 56. Se. Mo. Hosp., 616 F.3d at 894. 
 57. Id. at 895. 
 58. Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608, (8th Cir. 2011). 
 59. Id. at 618. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This section will explain bundled discounts and then discuss various 
tests proposed to analyze bundled discounts. These tests include the discount 
attribution test, the anticompetitive foreclosure test, and the equally efficient 
competitor test as well as tests applied in Europe.  This section then con-
cludes by discussing the Eighth Circuit’s history with bundled discounts. 
A.  Bundled Discounts 
Bundled discounts include a variety of discounting practices,60 but the 
most common definition is when a firm offers a package of products for a 
price less than the total price of the products sold individually.61  Pure bun-
dling is when a firm only offers the package and not the products individu-
ally.62  Mixed bundling is when a firm offers both the discounted package and 
the individual, undiscounted products.63  Bundled discounts have similar ele-
ments to predatory pricing, exclusive dealing, and tying, but with a few key 
differences.64  A buyer is not required to purchase a second product in a bun-
dled discount, but the buyer is incentivized to do so because of the discount.65  
The key to distinguishing bundled discounts from other practices is that they 
span across multiple products and are purchase target discounts requiring a 
buyer to purchase a certain amount before receiving the discount.66  Bundled 
  
 60. Timothy J. Muris & Vernon L. Smith, Antitrust and Bundled Discounts:  An 
Experimental Analysis, 75 ANTITRUST L. J. 399, 399 (2008); Popofsky, supra note 2, 
at 1287. 
 61. Lambert, supra note 3, at 911; Popofsky, supra note 2, at 1287-88; Steuer, 
supra note 3, at 25; Kilper, supra note 3, at 1364. 
 62. Kobayashi, supra note 4, at 710. 
 63. Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, The Elusive Antitrust Standard on 
Bundling in Europe and in the United States in the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases, 
76 ANTITRUST L. J. 483, 487 (2009); Kobayashi, supra note 4, at 711. 
 64. Herbert Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 841, 850 
(2006); Steuer, supra note 3, at 25.  Exclusive dealing is when a firm requires a buyer 
to purchase a certain percentage of their products for a discount.  Hovenkamp, supra, 
at 846.  For example, an office agrees to purchase all of their paper needs from the 
seller if the seller agrees to a twenty percent discount.  Id.  Tying is when a firm re-
quires a buyer to purchase two products; one product cannot be purchased without 
purchasing the other.  Id. at 849.  For example, a buyer could be required to purchase 
a lamp and a lampshade for one single price rather than being able to purchase the 
lamp and lampshade separately.  Bundled discounts and tying seem very similar but 
tying does not necessarily include a discount and bundled discounts do not prevent a 
buyer from purchasing the products separately without the discount.  Id. at 849-50. 
 65. Hovenkamp, supra note 64, at 851. 
 66. Id. at 850; see Steuer, supra note 3, at 26.  
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discounts can be challenged under sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act or sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act.67 
The issue with bundled discounts is deciding whether they are procom-
petitive or anticompetitive.  Most commentators agree that the majority of 
bundled discounts are procompetitive.68  Bundled discounts can be beneficial 
to both the seller and the buyer and often buyers request bundled discounts 
from sellers.69  For the seller, offering a bundled discount can create a 
“broader relationship” with each customer; it can be used to establish or rein-
force long-term relationships by creating loyalty between the seller and 
buyer.70  They can also allow a seller to capture economies of scope in pro-
duction and other efficiencies, including reduced transaction and information 
costs and more efficient advertising.71  A seller can increase the sales of 
“multiple products with one sales call, one shipment, and one bill.”72  Bun-
dled discounts are also a device that sellers use to enter new markets.73  
The benefits for buyers are numerous as well.  Buyers benefit from re-
duced transaction costs by not having to negotiate with multiple sellers; this 
spares a buyer the time and expense of researching vendors.74  Buyers can 
also use their purchasing power to receive lower prices from sellers that can 
then be passed on to consumers.75  For these reasons, most commentators 
believe that bundled discounts are generally procompetitive.76  Experimental 
analysis has shown that bundled discounts actually increase consumer welfare 
even in situations where the purpose is to create welfare decreasing bundles.77  
Even when exclusion does occur, long term consumer surplus does not de-
crease.78  However, even though there are many benefits, there are instances 
where bundled discounts can be anticompetitive and exclusionary. 
The primary concern of bundled discounts is that they may exclude 
equally efficient rivals from the market, allowing the remaining firm to 
  
 67. Steuer, supra note 3, at 26. 
 68. Hovenkamp, supra note 64, at 843; Lambert, supra note 3, at 973; Muris & 
Smith, supra note 60, at 399. 
 69. Steuer, supra note 3, at 26.  
 70. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Obama Administration and Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1611, 1651 (2010); Steuer, supra note 3, at 26; Jeane 
A. Thomas & Ryan C. Tisch, Carrots and Sticks: In Defense of a Differentiated Ap-
proach to Bundled Discounts and Tying, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 161, 161 (2010). 
 71. Kobayashi, supra note 4, at 708. 
 72. Steuer, supra note 3, at 26. 
 73. Kobayashi, supra note 4, at 708. 
 74. Steuer, supra note 3, at 26. 
 75. Richard M. Steuer, Bundling Beyond Borders, ANTITRUST, Summer 2010, at  
41 [hereinafter Steuer, Bundling Beyond Borders]. 
 76. See Lambert, supra note 3, at 973-74. 
 77. Muris & Smith, supra note 60, at 403. 
 78. Id.  
8
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charge higher prices.79  An equally efficient rival could be foreclosed if they 
do not offer as wide of a product line as the firm offering the bundled dis-
count.80  To compete with a firm offering a bundled discount, the competitor 
selling only one of the products in the bundle would have to attribute the en-
tire amount of the discount to its one product rather than across several prod-
ucts as the discounting firm may do.81  This may result in the competitor hav-
ing to sell its product below cost.82 
In addition, some commentators argue that bundled discounts are not 
true discounts at all; instead sellers are charging higher prices to buyers who 
purchase individual products.83  Essentially, they claim that bundled dis-
counts impose a penalty or tax on buyers who opt out of the bundle.84  Ac-
cording to these scholars, this can create the same effects as tying.85  As seen, 
bundled discounts have many procompetitive benefits, but they can also ex-
clude rivals from the market in violation of antitrust laws.  The question in 
antitrust law today is how to differentiate between bundled discounts that are 
procompetitive and should be legal, and those that are harmful and should be 
prohibited.86 
B.  Tests for Analyzing Bundled Discounts 
1.  Discount Attribution Test 
A number of tests have been proposed for analyzing bundled discounts.  
One of the leading tests is the discount attribution test adopted by the Ninth 
Circuit in Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth.87  The attribution test 
applies the full discount to the competitive product in the bundle.88  If after 
the discount is applied, the price of the competitive product is below the 
seller’s costs, then the bundled discount may be exclusionary – it may be 
anticompetitive and illegal.89  A “safe harbor” is created for above-cost bun-
dled discounts, which most commentators think is necessary because they do 
not create the same risk of harm to competition.90  The measure of cost used 
  
 79. Lambert, supra note 3, at 964. 
 80. See Lambert, supra note 3, at 964; Steuer, supra note 3, at 26. 
 81. Lambert, supra note 3, at 963-64. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Mo-
nopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 450 (2009); Popofsky, supra note 2, at 
1288. 
 84. Popofsky, supra note 2, at 1288; see Elhauge, supra note 83, at 450. 
 85. Elhauge, supra note 84, at 450. 
 86. See Hovenkamp, , at 841. 
 87. 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 88. Id. at 906. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Lambert, supra 3, at 912, 962; Popofsky, supra note 2, at 1289. 
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is the average variable cost of each product.91  This test “makes the . . . bun-
dled discounts legal unless” it could “exclude a hypothetical equally efficient 
[rival] of the competitive product.”92  The Antitrust Modernization Commis-
sion has adopted a similar standard except they have added an additional step 
that requires the discounting firm be likely to recoup any short-term losses 
from the discount if it is below-cost.93  It appears likely that some variation of 
the attribution test will be adopted by courts.94 
Most commentators agree that the attribution test is under deterrent, that 
it will not capture all of the bundled discounts that are anticompetitive, but 
they prefer this test because they believe most bundled discounts are not an-
ticompetitive and this test is unlikely to chill the use of them.95  This reason-
ing is similar to the Supreme Court of the United States’ reasoning in Brooke 
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, where the Court 
created the test for predatory pricing claims.96  The discount attribution test 
builds off the predatory pricing test.  A benefit to the attribution standard is 
that it provides a clear guideline for businesses to follow that also protects 
competitive rivals from exclusion.97  This test only excludes rivals that are 
less efficient or that refuse to charge competitive prices for their products.98  
However, not all commentators agree that the discount attribution test is the 
best option. 
Some antitrust scholars believe that the attribution test should not be ap-
plied because it does not cover bundled discounts that charge a penalty to 
buyers who opt out of the bundle.99  The discount attribution test only finds 
below-cost discounts exclusionary and these “penalty discounts” are above-
cost.100  For other scholars who believe bundled discounts create the same 
harms as tying, this test would still allow these harms to occur and it is incon-
sistent with tying precedent.101  Another criticism of the test is that it is over-
deterrent when the products in the bundle “are subject to joint costs or sold in 
variable proportions,” or when the bundle includes more than just two prod-
  
 91. Steuer, supra note 3, at 27. 
 92. Id. (quoting Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895, 916 
(9th Cir. 2007), superseded by 515 F.3d 883); see also Lambert, supra note 3, at 963, 
964-65. 
 93. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d at 900; Popofsky, supra note 2, at 1289. 
 94. Steuer, supra note 3, at 27. 
 95. See Lambert, supra note 3, at 963, 979; Popofsky, supra note 2, at 1289-90; 
Thomas & Tisch, supra note 70, at 176-77.  
 96. 509 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1993). 
 97. Lambert, supra note 3, at 979; Popofsky, supra note 2, at 1293-94; Thomas 
& Tisch, supra note 70, at 177. 
 98. Lambert, supra note 3, at 975. 
 99. See Elhauge, supra note 83, at 463. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 464. 
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ucts.102  Because of these concerns, some scholars believe that the attribution 
test is just a starting point, and that a larger safe harbor is needed such as one 
that requires substantial market foreclosure in the competitive market or a 
likelihood of recoupment by a defendant.103 
2.  Anticompetitive Foreclosure Test 
A second test that has been proposed and adopted by the Third Circuit in 
LePage’s Inc. v. 3M is the anticompetitive foreclosure test.104  The test ana-
lyzes whether the bundled discount “impermissibly excludes” competition in 
the competitive market.105  The court will then decide if the procompetitive 
business justifications for the bundled discount outweigh the anticompetitive 
effects.106  This test has been widely criticized.107  The main criticism with 
LePage’s decision and the test is that the court focused solely on the defen-
dant’s conduct rather than considering whether the plaintiff was a less effi-
cient competitor.108  The court was also criticized for focusing on the defen-
dant’s conduct in relation to the plaintiff, rather than to competition in gen-
eral.109  Finally, scholars thought the test was likely to chill bundled dis-
counts110 because it was unclear exactly what conduct was illegal;111 the court 
gave little guidance on how to weigh procompetitive benefits with anticom-
petitive harms leaving businesses unsure on how juries will decide whether 
the discount is illegal.112  The Third Circuit concluded that bundled discounts 
offered by monopolists are anticompetitive if their competitors do not offer as 
diverse of a product line regardless of the effects of the bundled discount on 
competition.113 
3.  Equally Efficient Competitor Test 
A third test was adopted in Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc., v. Abbott 
Laboratories, Inc. – the equally efficient competitor test (EEC).114  The 
  
 102. Hovenkamp, supra note 64, at 1658. 
 103. Id.; Lambert, supra note 3, at 979. 
 104. 324 F.3d 141, 162 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 105. Thomas & Tisch, supra note 70, at 168. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 169. 
 108. Id.; see also Popofsky, supra note 2, at 1288. 
 109. Thomas & Tisch, supra note 70, at 169. 
 110. Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688, 
1723 (2005) [hereinafter Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts]; Thomas & Tisch, 
supra note 70, at 169.  
 111. Popofsky, supra note 2, at 1288; Kilper, supra note 3, at 1381-82.   
 112. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, supra note 110, at 1724-25. 
 113. Thomas & Tisch, supra note 70, at 170. 
 114. 920 F. Supp. 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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Southern District of New York held that a plaintiff must either allege that the 
bundled discount results in below-cost pricing or that it excludes an equally 
efficient competitor by making it unprofitable for the plaintiff to compete.115  
This test has also been criticized by many antitrust scholars because it could 
prohibit procompetitive bundled discounts and it protects individual competi-
tors rather than competition amongst competitors in the marketplace.116  In 
addition, courts will have a difficult time administering the test because ascer-
taining the costs of the defendant is extremely difficult and it may require 
multiple lawsuits if the particular plaintiff is not the equally efficient competi-
tor.117  The EEC focuses on the “competitive virtue of the rival” rather than 
on the effect the bundled discount has on “consumer welfare and effi-
ciency.”118 
4. Additional Tests 
A multitude of other tests have also been suggested by various scholars 
including using the same tests applied to tying and exclusive dealing or using 
the predatory pricing test established in Brooke Group.119  One test suggested 
focuses on determining whether a bundle discount offers a true discount or if 
it is merely a penalty for not buying the bundle.120  Another test, the evalua-
tive approach, looks at whether there are barriers to entry in the market or if 
there is some other way the plaintiff can compete with the bundle, such as 
through coordination with other producers or by becoming a supplier to the 
defendant.121  In Europe, courts focus on bundled discounts offered by domi-
nant firms; they are less concerned with firms gaining a dominant position 
than they are with their behavior once they are dominant.122  The European 
  
 115. Id. at 469. 
 116. Muris & Smith, supra note 60, at 427. 
 117. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, supra note 110, at 1729-30. 
 118. Elhauge, supra note 83, at 464. 
 119. See Popofsky, supra note 2, at 1288-89.   
 120. Elhauge, supra note 83, at 474.  Elhauge’s test has received a lot of attention 
by antitrust scholars.  See, e.g., Lambert, supra note 3 (providing a “comprehensive 
response to Elhauge’s arguments”).  Elhauge’s article focuses on debunking the single 
monopoly profit theory that is applied to tying.  Elhauge, supra note 83.  Elhauge 
argues that there are certain assumptions in tying that must be made for the single 
monopoly profit theory to be true.  Id. at 400.  If we relax those assumptions then 
certain effects occur, all of which harm consumer welfare and total welfare.  Id. at 
400-01.  Elhauge then argues that bundled discounts have the same effects as ties in 
certain situations and sometimes are not true discounts but rather “penalties” for buy-
ers who opt out of the bundle.  Id. at 402-03.  Therefore, bundled discounts should be 
treated like ties and should be illegal based on market power with but-for price excep-
tion.  Id. at 403.  
 121. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, supra note 110, at 1742. 
 122. Thomas & Tisch, supra note 70, at 171; see Economides & Lianos, supra 
note 63, at 497-98. 
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courts apply the same tests used for tying arrangements as United States 
courts, while the European Commission suggests a standard closer to the 
attribution test with a safe harbor for above-cost bundles.123  Because of the 
various benefits and criticisms of each proposed test, the law has been in a 
state of flux for the past decade;124 however, one thing is agreed on by : bun-
dled discounts should not be treated as unlawful per se.125 
C. The Eighth Circuit and Bundled Discounts 
The controlling case in the Eighth Circuit with respect to bundled dis-
counts is Concord Boat Corporation v. Brunswick.126  Brunswick Corporation 
offered market share discounts on its stern drive engines.127  Purchasers who 
agreed to buy a certain percentage of engines from Brunswick were given a 
discount off the list price.128  None of the discounts offered by Brunswick 
required boat builders to buy a certain amount of engines, nor did it prevent 
purchasers from buying from different suppliers.129  Boat builders filed suit 
alleging that Brunswick and other manufacturers who had implemented simi-
lar discounts violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.130 
The court held that Brunswick did not violate sections 1 or 2 of the 
Sherman Act.131  The discount was not exclusive because the builders were 
allowed to walk away at any time, they were not required to commit to any 
specific amount, and there were no significant barriers to entry into the en-
gine market.132  The court mentioned that price cutting was the “very essence 
of competition” and that attempting to control prices created a dangerous risk 
of chilling price cuts that are beneficial to consumers.133  The court held that 
as long as the price is still above the firm’s average variable costs, the plain-
tiff must overcome a “strong presumption of legality.”134  According to the 
Eighth Circuit, above-cost discounts are generally not anticompetitive.135  
The Concord Boat court expressly distinguished these discounts from 
bundled discounts;136 however, in the instant decision, the Eighth Circuit 
  
 123. See Economides & Lianos, supra note 63, at 500, 504-05. 
 124. Thomas & Tisch, supra note 70, at 176. 
 125. See Hovenkamp, supra note 64, at 844. 
 126. 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000).  Even though this case does not address bun-
dled discounts directly, it does discuss above-cost discounts specifically.  See id.    
 127. Id. at 1044. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1045. 
 130. Id. at 1045-46. 
 131. Id. at 1063. 
 132. Id. at 1059. 
 133. Id. at 1061. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id.  
 136. Id. at 1062. 
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applied Concord Boat because it was the only case somewhat applicable to 
bundled discounts.137  In Concord Boat, the district court had examined cases 
involving bundling or tying in its initial analysis.138  However, on appeal, the 
Eighth Circuit pointed out that bundling and tying cases required two separate 
product markets to be linked, whereas in Concord Boat there was only one 
product at issue.139  Thus, the cases relied on by the district court were not 
persuasive.140  Even though the court distinguished bundled discounts in its 
holding, Concord Boat is the most applicable Eighth Circuit case available 
for bundled discounts. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
1. Majority Opinion 
In the instant decision, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision to grant summary judgment to Bard.141  The court first denied St. 
Francis’ claims relating to share-based discounts by applying standards set 
out in Concord Boat.142  In Concord Boat, the court held that because the 
agreements were voluntary and because the buyers were willing to purchase  
engines elsewhere for better discounts, the discounts offered by the defendant 
were not “de facto exclusionary dealing.”143  Similarly, in the instant deci-
sion, hospitals were not required to purchase 100 percent of their supplies 
from Bard to receive the discount and the suppliers could purchase from 
competitors.144  Because the share-based discounts were the “heart of the 
sole-source contracts, and the centerpiece of the bundled discounts” at issue 
in the instant decision, the court decided that Concord Boat was applicable.145 
The court then analyzed the relevant market that St. Francis identified, 
which was a threshold requirement for an antitrust claim according to Con-
cord Boat.146  The issue in the case was the relevant product market because 
both parties agreed the geographic market was the United States.147  The 
court looked to the cross-elasticity of demand between the product and any 
substitutes to establish the product market.148  The court noted that if the mar-
  
 137. See Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608, 611-18 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 138. Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1062. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. 
 141. Se. Mo. Hosp., 642 F.3d at 610. 
 142. Id. at 612; see also Concord Boat, 207 F.3d 1039. 
 143. Se. Mo. Hosp., 642 F.3d at 612 (citing Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1060). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 613. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id.  
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss1/7
File: CullmanPaginated.docx Created on: 10/21/13 10:03 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:09 PM 
2013] BUNGLED BUNDLED DISCOUNTS 313 
 
ket was broad, a sub-market may be needed for the antitrust analysis.149  The 
court looked to Brown Shoe Company v. United States for factors to deter-
mine whether a submarket existed.150  St. Francis alleged two submarkets: 
one for Foley catheters sold under GPO contracts and another for intermittent 
catheters sold under GPO contracts.151  Because the GPO contracts were not 
specialized, the court rejected these submarkets.152  
The court found that GPOs did not provide additional distribution effi-
ciencies or advantages that were needed to define a submarket.153  In addition, 
hospitals were able to purchase their supplies outside of the GPOs and did not 
rely on GPOs for expertise in purchasing certain catheters over others.154  St. 
Francis argued that the “significant cost savings” distinguished catheters sold 
through GPOs from catheters sold independently.155   However, the Supreme 
Court of the United States has stated that a price differential does not create a 
separate market and it has warned courts to use caution when dealing with 
unfair pricing claims.156  Therefore, the court decided that St. Francis could 
not use this as reasoning for two distinct markets.157  The Eighth Circuit noted 
that even if a price differential was able to establish a market, in the instant 
case, there was no evidence of “significant cost savings.”158  In fact, some 
non-GPO catheters were cheaper than Bard’s GPO catheter.159  The record 
showed that St. Francis chose Bard catheters because the physicians preferred 
them over other brands, not because of the discount.160  
St. Francis also argued that “a small but significant non-transitory in-
crease in price (SSNIP) in the GPO market did not cause customers to 
switch” to other options and that the catheter market was foreclosed.161  
However, the court rejected both of these arguments for defining a submar-
ket.162  Although establishing a SSNIP could create a disputed issue of mate-
rial fact, the court did not find that there were any facts supporting St. Fran-
  
 149. Id. at 614. 
 150. Id. (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)).  Factors 
to consider include “industry or public recognition of [a] separate economic character, 
special uses or characteristics or production facilities, distinct customers or prices, 
price sensitivity, and specialized vendors.” Id. (citing Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 
325). 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 614-15. 
 153. Id. at 615. 
 154. See Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 615-16. 
 160. Id. at 616. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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cis’ theory.163  As for the market foreclosure, the court found that St. Francis 
performed an incorrect analysis.164  St. Francis looked to what products the 
hospital ultimately bought, but the question to be asked was what products 
were reasonably available to the hospitals.165  Because of the aforementioned 
reasons, the court held that St. Francis did not establish a relevant product 
submarket under the Brown Shoe factors.166 
The court also rejected St. Francis’ claim that the “claw-back” provi-
sions under the GPO contract prevented hospitals from switching to another 
supplier.167  Because hospitals could purchase catheters off-contract and be-
cause the agreements were voluntary and “terminable at will and on short-
notice,” hospitals could purchase catheters from other brands.168  Nothing in 
the record indicated that any penalties that occurred from switching brands 
deterred hospitals from switching to take advantage of better offers.169  The 
contractual restraints of a particular plaintiff do not determine if a product is 
interchangeable when establishing a product market.  The use of the product 
by the general consumer is what is important.170  According to the court, St. 
Francis failed to establish that Foley and intermittent catheters were separate 
product submarkets different than those sold through non-GPO contracts.171  
Finally, St. Francis attempted to argue that the relevant product market 
for Foley catheters sold in both GPO contracts and non-GPO contracts was 
the entire United States.172  However, the court determined that St. Francis 
waived this argument because it failed to raise it with the district court.173  
Because St. Francis did not establish a relevant product market and because 
Concord Boat precluded St. Francis’ challenge, the court affirmed summary 
judgment for Bard.174 
 
2.  Dissenting Opinion 
 
Judge Clarence Beam wrote a dissenting opinion in favor of reversing 
and remanding the district court’s grant of summary judgment because he 
believed there were disputed questions of material fact that should not have 
been resolved with summary judgment.175  First, the dissent did not agree that 
  
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 617. 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 618. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. at 620 (Beam, J., dissenting). 
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St. Francis waived the issue of establishing the market to include all Foley 
and intermittent catheters, whether sold under GPOs or not.176  Judge Beam 
argued that St. Francis did not waive the argument because the record con-
tained facts supporting and discussing the market – the issue was raised in the 
complaint and in the summary judgment papers – and the district court dis-
cussed the specific product market.177  As for establishing a relevant submar-
ket, Judge Beam believed that the district court “improperly weigh[ed] the 
evidence against St. Francis.”178  One such piece of evidence that should have 
been presented to a jury was whether physician brand preferences for cathe-
ters influenced if catheters were interchangeable between brands.179  Because 
this evidence went towards establishing a relevant product market, which is a 
factual issue, Judge Beam thought the evidence should have been presented to 
the jury.180  Judge Beam thought that St. Francis introduced other evidence, 
as well, for determining a submarket that required the claims to survive sum-
mary judgment.181 
Judge Beam also believed that St. Francis presented a question of mate-
rial fact on whether Bard violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.182  
Because St. Francis presented evidence of entry barriers into the catheter 
market along with evidence of high market shares in the various relevant 
markets proposed, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Bard had market power as required for a section 2 violation.183  In addition, 
Judge Beam thought there were questions as to whether Bard’s conduct was 
anticompetitive.184  He agreed that Concord Boat should guide the issue and 
in that case the court found that bundled discounts that link monopolistic 
products with competitive products may be anticompetitive.185  In Judge 
Beam’s opinion, St. Francis presented evidence that Bard’s bundled discounts 
may be exclusive, creating a question of fact as to whether they were an-
ticompetitive.186  Although it was not clear whether the court would have 
adopted the attribution test, St. Francis created a question of fact as to 
whether under the test Bard’s conduct was anticompetitive.187  Finally, Judge 
Beam believed that St. Francis also created a question as to whether they 
suffered an antitrust injury by presenting evidence that they paid a higher 
  
 176. Id. at 621. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.  
 179. See id. at 620-21. 
 180. Id. at 621. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 622. 
 183. Id. at 623. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 624. 
 187. Id. 
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price for Bard catheters.188  Because of the evidence presented by St. Francis 
as to the relevant product market and as to Bard’s bundled discounts, Judge 
Beam thought there were questions of material fact that should have been 
presented to a jury, not decided by summary judgment.189 
V. COMMENT 
This section begins with an analysis of the impact of the instant decision 
on future bundled discounts.  Next, this section discusses what the court 
should have done, concluding that the Eighth Circuit should have taken this 
opportunity to choose a test to apply to bundled discounts. 
A. Impact of the Decision 
In the instant decision, the court focused on the definition of the market 
and did not address the issue of bundled discounts.190  The court gave no in-
dication as to the future of bundled discounts.  Unlike the first opinion va-
cated by the Eighth Circuit that applied the discount attribution test to the 
bundled discounts at issue,191 the instant decision did not address which test, 
if any, should be applied. By not addressing bundled discounts, the central 
issue of the case, the court kept the law in flux; there is no direction on how 
bundled discounts will be addressed in the future.  This greatly affects busi-
nesses using bundled discounts.  Because a business does not know which 
test will be applied or how the court will analyze bundled discounts, they 
cannot assess their risk or shape their policies to ensure that they are comply-
ing with the law.  If a business cannot plan for the future, then it may stop 
using bundled discounts altogether. 
After the LePage’s192 and PeaceHealth193 decisions, it made sense for 
courts to pause and wait to make a decision on the proper test to apply.  At 
the time, there was little research on possible tests and their implications or 
on whether bundled discounts were procompetitive or anticompetitive.  In 
fact, after the LePage’s decision, the United States Attorney General recom-
mended that the Supreme Court of the United States not take up the issue of 
bundled discounts until more research could be done and more case law could 
be developed because it was uncertain whether the practice was exclusion-
  
 188. Id. at 625. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. at 613. (majority opinion). 
 191. Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 616 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 2010), vacated, 642 
F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 192. See supra note 104-13 and accompanying text.    
 193. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.   
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss1/7
File: CullmanPaginated.docx Created on: 10/21/13 10:03 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:09 PM 
2013] BUNGLED BUNDLED DISCOUNTS 317 
 
ary.194  However, it has now been more than nine years since LePage’s,195 
and numerous articles have been written and experimental analysis has been 
done on bundled discounts. Thus, there is ample information and research to 
make a decision on a test for bundled discounts.  
Courts need to start making decisions on what tests they will apply so 
businesses can start planning and analyzing their bundled discounts to make 
them legal.  One of the many criticisms of the LePage’s decision is that it 
gives little guidance to businesses on how to approach these discounts.196  By 
not making a decision on a test or even starting the dialogue on an appropriate 
test, courts are refusing to give direction.  A fear of many scholars in choos-
ing a test is that the test will be too restrictive and will chill bundled dis-
counts.197  This same effect may occur if courts avoid the issue altogether.  
Businesses may stop using bundled discounts because they will have no idea 
how courts are going to analyze them and decide their legality.  This will 
ultimately harm consumers because bundled discounts are generally thought 
of as beneficial to consumers.198  The courts’ indecision is negatively affect-
ing businesses and consumers.  
B.  What the Court Should Have Done 
One major analysis the instant decision avoided was a discussion of the 
discount attribution test.199  At the very least, the court should have addressed 
this test or another test that was proposed by one of the parties.  A mere dis-
cussion of the numerous proposed tests would have given at least some indi-
cation of the court’s opinions where it may be heading in the future.  The 
facts of this case, similar to those in PeaceHealth,200 were set up perfectly for 
a decision on bundled discounts and further development of the various tests, 
but the court missed this opportunity.  This opinion was a great chance for 
bundled discounts to reach the Supreme Court of the United States, but be-
cause the court focused on the wrong issue, the relevant market definition, the 
opportunity was foreclosed. 
The court took a much different approach with the instant decision than 
it did with the vacated opinion.201  The opinions focus on two completely 
  
 194. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 3M Co. v. LePage’s, Inc., 
542 U.S. 953 (2004) (No. 02-1865), 2004 WL 1205191, at *14-17. 
 195. See LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 196. Thomas & Tisch, supra note 70, at 175. 
 197. Lambert, supra note 3, at 977, 980; Popofsky, supra note 2, at 1289; Thomas 
& Tisch, supra note 70, at 176, 178. 
 198. Muris & Smith, supra note 60, at 403; Steuer, supra note 3, at 26; Steuer, 
Bundling Beyond Borders, supra note 75, at 41. 
 199. This test was discussed in the vacated opinion.  See Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. 
Bard, Inc., 616 F.3d 888, 893 (8th Cir. 2010), vacated, 642 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 200. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.  
 201. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.   
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different things with little explanation of why the court chose to abandon its 
initial logic.  The instant decision is disjunctive and makes it seem as if the 
court is grasping for straws to avoid bundled discounts and decide the case on 
a smaller, less complex issue.  In contrast, the vacated opinion gets to the 
heart of the issue and focuses on bundled discounts.202  In the instant deci-
sion, as reasoning for ignoring the bundled discounts, the court stated that the 
case was not distinguishable from Concord Boat because the share-based 
discounts were the “heart of the sole-source contracts, and the centerpiece of 
the bundled discounts.”203  This explanation makes little sense especially 
when comparing it to the vacated opinion that thought the bundled discounts 
were central to the decision.204  The court’s complete reversal in its approach 
to this opinion is difficult to understand especially in light of the need for 
development in case law on bundled discounts.  Also, it is confusing that the 
court would rely heavily on Concord Boat to decide this case when it did not 
involve multi-product discounting.  One thing the instant decision makes 
clear is that challenges to bundled discounts will be difficult to bring before 
the Eighth Circuit and will need distinguishing characteristics such as long-
term contracts to be viable.  
Bundled discounts are a difficult area of antitrust.  Opinions differ 
widely on their benefits as evidenced by the numerous approaches taken in 
the United States as well as the approach taken in Europe.205  But many 
scholars have come to the conclusion that a less restrictive test is best to pre-
vent chilling bundled discounts.206  Some direction, any direction at this 
point, after so many years since LePage’s and PeaceHealth, is necessary for 
businesses.  Enough scholarship has been done for courts to make meaningful 
decisions on the best course of action.  The Supreme Court also needs to take 
up the issue to create national uniformity. but it cannot do so without a lower 
court first addressing the issue.  The application of the discount attribution 
test in the vacated opinion gave businesses guidance.  By vacating the opin-
ion, the Eighth Circuit created even more confusion on what will be done in 
the future.  The court leaves us with too many unanswered questions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As can be seen, bundled discounts create controversy and it is unclear 
where courts will go from here.  There are many tests, all with positives and 
negatives.  Scholars disagree on which test should be applied and what the 
goals of the chosen test should be.  However, more and more scholars do 
  
 202. See Se. Mo. Hosp., 616 F.3d at 893.   
 203. Se. Mo. Hosp., 642 F.3d at 613. 
 204. See Se. Mo. Hosp., 616 F.3d at 892-93. 
 205. See Economides & Lianos, supra note 63, at 497; Thomas & Tisch, supra 
note 70, at 171. 
 206. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
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agree that bundled discounts are generally procompetitive and that we should 
worry about chilling these discounts with too strict of a test.  In the instant 
decision, the Eighth Circuit had the opportunity to delve into bundled dis-
counts and do a careful analysis of the various tests proposed.  However, they 
passed on the opportunity and have chosen instead to keep the law undecided 
and unclear.  Businesses have little guidance on the legality of different dis-
counts which may cause them to be used less and less.  After the instant deci-
sion, the law on bundled discounts continues to remain in flux. 
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